University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Wharton Pension Research Council Working
Papers

Wharton Pension Research Council

9-1-2017

Getting More from Less in Defined Benefit Plans: Three Levers for
a Low-Return World
Daniel B. Berkowitz
Andrew S. Clarke
Kevin J. DiCiurcio
Kimberly A. Stockton
Daniel W. Wallick

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers
Part of the Economics Commons

Berkowitz, Daniel B.; Clarke, Andrew S.; DiCiurcio, Kevin J.; Stockton, Kimberly A.; and Wallick, Daniel W.,
"Getting More from Less in Defined Benefit Plans: Three Levers for a Low-Return World" (2017). Wharton
Pension Research Council Working Papers. 32.
https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/32

The published version of this Working Paper may be found in the 2018 publication: How Persistent Low Returns
Will Shape Saving and Retirement.
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/32
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Getting More from Less in Defined Benefit Plans: Three Levers for a Low-Return
World
Abstract
As global interest rates hover near historic lows, defined benefit pension plan sponsors must grapple with
the prospect of lower investment returns. This paper examines three levers that can enhance portfolio
outcomes in a low-return world. The levers include: increased contributions; reduced investment costs;
and increased portfolio risk. We use portfolio simulations based on a stochastic asset class forecasting
model to evaluate each lever according to two criteria—its magnitude of impact and the certainty that this
impact will be realized. Our analysis indicates that increased contributions have the greatest and most
certain impact. Reduced costs have a more modest, but equally certain impact. Increased risk can deliver
a significant impact, but with the least certainty.
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Chapter 4
Getting More from Less in Deﬁned
Beneﬁt Plans: Three Levers for a
Low-Return World
Daniel W. Wallick, Daniel B. Berkowitz, Andrew S. Clarke,
Kevin J. DiCiurcio, and Kimberly A. Stockton

As ﬁxed income yields hover near historic lows, deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) pension plan sponsors must grapple with a rise in the present value of their plan
liabilities and a fall in prospective investment returns. Our asset class projections illustrate the change. From 1926 through 2016, a portfolio with a
60 percent allocation to global equities and 40 percent to global ﬁxed
income generated an annualized real return of 5.5 percent. For the ten
years through 2026, we estimate that the median return for the same portfolio will be about two percentage points lower, as illustrated in Table 4.1.
The prospect of lower returns has reshaped retirement plan sponsor
expectations. In 2014, 42 percent of corporate DB plans surveyed by
Stockton (2016) projected median long-term returns of more than 7 percent.1
In 2015, only 31 percent expected returns of more than 7 percent.2 Even
as expected returns decline, most plans are underfunded. J.P. Morgan
(2015) estimates that DB plans sponsored by companies in the Russell
3000 Index have an aggregate funded ratio of 80.5 percent. The present
value of every dollar in pension obligations, in other words, is backed by
about 80 cents in assets. Public sector plans face even greater challenges.
Aggregate assets in the largest public plans, according to actuary and
beneﬁts consultant Milliman, equaled an estimated 69.8 percent of total
plan liabilities as of 2016. Novy-Marx and Rauh (2014) explore the funding shortfall through another lens, estimating that state and local pension
plans would need to increase contributions over the next 30 years by 2.5
times to fund legacy liabilities and future service accruals.
This chapter examines three levers that plan sponsors can use to improve
their funding levels in a lower-return future. Sponsors can either increase
contributions, reduce costs, or increase risk. While we explore these levers in
the context of a total return investment strategy, we typically encourage wellfunded corporate DB plans to adopt a liability-driven investment (LDI)
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TABLE . Future returns may not look like those from the past: Implications
for a 60 percent equity/40 percent ﬁxed income allocation
Historical return (%)

Projected return, 2016–2026 (%)

1926–2016 2000–2016 25th Percentile 50th Percentile 75th Percentile
Nominal
Real

8.5
5.5

4.9
2.7

3.1
1.2

5.6
3.8

8.1
6.4

Note: The historical returns for our hypothetical portfolios are based on data for the
appropriate market indexes through September 2016. The projected returns reﬂect the
following allocation: 60 percent global equity and 40 percent global ﬁxed income. The subasset
allocation for equities is 60 percent US equity and 40 percent global ex-US equity, unhedged
in USD, rebalanced annually. The subasset allocation for ﬁxed income is 70 percent US bonds
and 30 percent global ex-US bonds, hedged in USD, rebalanced annually. Projected returns
at each percentile are based on 10,000 simulations generated by the Vanguard Capital Markets
Model®
Source : Authors’ computation.

strategy. An LDI strategy changes the concept of risk from a focus on return
volatility to a focus on the stability and level of the funded ratio (Stockton
2014). Even so, total return is an important focus for many pension plans.
If a plan with a long time horizon can tolerate a total return strategy’s
attendant contribution volatility, the sponsor can beneﬁt from the potential
for lower total contributions over the life of the plan. Cash balance plans
and hybrid pension plans, which combine ﬁnal-pay and cash balance plans,
often default to total return strategies, as do most public pension plans.
We evaluate each lever according to its magnitude and certainty of
impact. We deﬁne ‘magnitude’ as the change in the expected value of a
$100 million portfolio over a ten-year investment horizon. ‘Certainty’ refers
to the change in the projected dispersion of portfolio values. In what follows,
we start with an overview of the motivations and investment rationales for
each of the three levers and conclude with a hierarchical assessment of their
potential impact on portfolio returns, risk, and expected values. We also
detail the impact of risk-oriented investment decisions on a hypothetical DB
plan’s funded ratio.

Increase Contributions for a Signiﬁcant and
Certain Impact on Portfolio Value
An increase in contributions is the most reliable strategy to improve DB
plan funding levels. Every additional dollar in contributions immunizes a
dollar of future liabilities against the vagaries of capital market returns.
The decision to increase contributions must compete with other uses of
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Figure 4.1. The impact of annual contributions on funded ratios
Note : We model three scenarios to show how increased contributions can minimize the risk that
a plan sponsor will be unable to meet its pension obligations. We simulate projected funded
ratios for a 60 percent equity/40 percent bond portfolio that starts with $60 million in assets and
liabilities of $73.4 million. We assume annual contributions of $0, $1 million, and $2 million
over a ten-year period. Contributions are made at the end of each year.
Source: Authors’ calculations.

corporate cash ﬂow such as capital investment and returns to shareholders,
but the beneﬁts to active and retired participants are clear.
Consider a DB plan with $60 million in assets and $73.4 million in
liabilities. Its funded ratio is 82 percent. In this simpliﬁed illustration, the
portfolio manager initially allocates 60 percent of plan assets to global
equities and 40 percent to global bonds. We model changes in the portfolio’s value over a ten-year period to illustrate the impact of additional
contributions.3 Figure 4.1 presents the probabilities that a portfolio will
achieve a 90 percent or 100 percent funded status assuming three levels of
annual contribution: $0; $1 million; and $2 million.
Increased contributions have a certain impact, and if the contributions
are large enough, the magnitude of impact can be high. Annual contributions of $1 million raise the probability of reaching full funding from
47 percent to 66 percent over a 10-year period. Contributions of $2 million
per year yield an 81 percent probability, increasing the sponsor’s ﬂexibility
to implement LDI strategies that limit the plan’s vulnerability to changes in
interest rates and asset and liability values.4 We recognize that competing demands for cash can make higher contributions impossible or
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unattractive for some plan sponsors, but it is worth remembering that this
is a powerful lever.

Reduce Costs for a More Modest but Certain
Impact on Portfolio Value
Whether a pension plan retains the services of in-house or external portfolio
managers, the only guarantee is that those services have a cost. The future
performance delivered by those managers is uncertain. All else equal,
reducing costs has a certain and positive impact on the future value of a
portfolio. The short-term beneﬁts are relatively modest. Over time, however,
a modest reduction in costs can deliver signiﬁcant long-term beneﬁts as
annual savings compound.
Table 4.2 quantiﬁes the impact of costs on a portfolio with an initial value
of $100 million. We assume a return of 7 percent per year before fees, a
ﬁgure consistent with plan sponsors’ expectations in Stockton’s survey. Net
of 100 basis points in annual fees, the portfolio’s value would grow to about
$178 million after 10 years. If fees had been 50 basis points, however, the
portfolio would have accumulated an additional $9 million in assets. Over
30 years, annual savings of 50 basis points would translate into more than
$90 million in additional assets.
The concept of reducing costs is simple, yet its impact is surprisingly
powerful. This is particularly true for plan sponsors with a long time horizon.
The compounded annual savings make bigger dents in funding shortfalls
with every passing year. Over 30 years, for example, a 50-basis-point difference
in annual costs compounds to more than 9,000 basis points (91 percentage
points) in cumulative return.
TABLE . The black magic of compounding costs:
Projected value of a $100 million portfolio
Portfolio values ($ million)
Cost (basis points)
0
25
50
75
100

10 years

20 years

30 years

196.7
191.9
187.1
182.6
178.1

387.0
368.1
350.2
333.2
317.1

761.3
706.3
655.4
608.3
564.8

Note: These calculations assume a return of 7 percent per year
before fees.
Source: Authors’ computation.
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Increase Risk for a Potentially Signiﬁcant
but Uncertain Impact
Boosting contributions and cutting costs address inﬂows and outﬂows to
deliver certain growth in a portfolio’s long-term value. Increasing portfolio
risk is a different strategy: it seeks to accelerate the rate at which portfolio
assets grow.
While increased risk can have a greater impact than increasing contributions and reducing costs, the certainty of success is lower. Among the widely
used risk-oriented strategies are: (1) increased allocations to global equities;
(2) style factor tilts; (3) allocations to traditional active equity management;
and (4) allocations to alternatives.
We assume that an increase in a portfolio’s strategic equity allocation
would be achieved through passively managed, market capitalization
weighted index portfolios. The other options—style factor tilts, traditional
active management, and alternatives—represent forms of active management. These strategies introduce active risk, but with the exception of some
alternatives, produce no change to a portfolio’s broad strategic allocation.
We review the investment cases for each risk-oriented strategy.
Higher equity allocation. Raising a plan’s strategic equity allocation represents a move along the efﬁcient frontier to a riskier portfolio, with a higher
expected return, as illustrated in Figure 4.2. A higher expected return can
help a plan close funding shortfalls, but the higher volatility associated with this
expected return also diminishes the certainty that this beneﬁt will be realized.
Style factor tilts. A static allocation to style factors seeks to improve the risk
and return characteristics expected from a portfolio’s allocation to broad
asset classes. Although researchers have identiﬁed a number of potential
style factors, we focus on three—size, value, and credit. Ilmanen (this
volume) explores the use of several other factors in retirement-plan portfolios. Size, value, and credit are notable for both the extensive literature
documenting each and the empirical research on their performance.
Table 4.3 includes possible risk-based or behavioral explanations for the
persistence of their excess returns (Banz 1981; Fama and French 1992,
1993; Pappas and Dickson 2015).
Like any active strategy, the use of factor tilts demands both a conviction
that the factors represent an enduring opportunity to earn a return premium and the patience to stick with this conviction through factors’ inevitable periods of underperformance.5
Actively managed equity funds.6 Traditional active management is another
option for plan sponsors. Stockton found that most DB plan sponsors
invest a majority of their assets in actively managed portfolios, as is
typical for institutional investors.7 Survey respondents reported that, on
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Figure 4.2. The efﬁcient frontier for a portfolio of global equities and global ﬁxed
income
Note: Calculations reﬂect median asset class return projections for the ten years through 2026.
Source: Authors’ calculations.

TABLE . Possible return rationales for select equity and ﬁxed income risk factors
Factor

Risk explanation

Behavioral explanation

Value (equity)

Cyclical risk of positive correlation
between economic activity and
security’s returns.
Cyclical risk of smaller ﬁrms being
more exposed to changing,
negative economic activity and
default risk.
Default and downgrade risk;
positive correlation to economic
activity.

Recency bias leads to investors
shunning distressed ﬁrms and
overpaying for recent growth.
N/A

Size (equity)

Credit
(ﬁxed income)

N/A

Sources: Banz (1981); Fama and French (1992, 1993); Pappas and Dickson (2015).

average, 66 percent of equity and 72 percent of ﬁxed income assets were
actively managed.
Three elements need to be present for active management to be successful: talent, cost, and patience. Talent is paramount. On average, the odds
that an active manager will outperform a relevant benchmark are low. In the
17 rolling 3-year periods for the 20 years ending 2016, only 15 percent of US
equity funds, on average, outperformed their benchmarks. When those
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results are weighted by assets under management rather than the number of
funds, the odds improved to 38 percent.
Although talent is key to beating the odds against outperformance, low
cost is another requirement, not simply because of the mathematical reality
that lower costs equal higher net returns. In an analysis of various portfolio
characteristics, Wallick et al. (2015b) found that cost is the most powerful
predictor of future outperformance.8
Even if an investor identiﬁes talent and secures it at a low cost, success
requires patience. Active managers typically produce inconsistent patterns
of returns, as illustrated in Figure 4.3. Of the 2,085 US-domiciled active
equity funds in existence at the start of 2000, only 552 (26 percent) outperformed their prospectus benchmark over the subsequent 15 years. Of that
26 percent, almost all (98 percent) failed to outperform their benchmarks
in at least four calendar years over the 15-year period. More than 50 percent
of these top performers delivered seven or more years of underperformance. Only those investors patient enough to hang on through these periods
of weakness managed to realize the superior long-term returns delivered by
these exceptional managers.

Percentage of Successful Funds
(%)

Alternative investments. Alternative investments are widely used in DB
plans. These investments include both non-traditional asset classes such as
real estate and commodities and specialized investment vehicles such as
private equity and hedge funds. On average, plan sponsors allocate 11 percent
40
35
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Figure 4.3. Even successful funds had multiple periods of underperformance:
Distribution of 552 funds that outperformed their index, 2000–2014
Note: Data are as of December 31, 2015. Successful funds are those that survived for the 15 years
and also outperformed their prospectus benchmarks. Our analysis was based on expenses and
fund returns for active equity funds available to US investors at the start of the period. When
multiple share classes existed, the oldest and lowest-cost single share class was used to represent
a fund. Funds that were merged or liquidated were considered underperformers for the
purposes of this analysis. The following fund categories were included: small-cap value,
small-cap growth, small-cap blend, mid-cap value, mid-cap growth, mid-cap blend, large-cap
value, large-cap growth, and large-cap blend.
Source: Vanguard calculations, using data from Morningstar, Inc.
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of portfolio assets to alternatives (Stockton 2016). Of the corporate plans
that invest in alternatives, 89 percent expected to maintain or increase their
allocations; the remaining 11 percent were considering a reduction in these
allocations.
We consider two alternative strategies: hedge funds and private equity.
Neither is a separate asset class; rather, they are a repackaging of publicly or
privately traded traditional asset classes. Both strategies represent a form of
active management. As with traditional active management, talent is key
because the spread between winners and losers is extreme, as illustrated in
Figure 4.4. In alternatives, however, the selection challenge is greater

Figure 4.4. Manager dispersion with private alternative investments is signiﬁcantly
higher than with traditional asset classes
Note: Public US active ﬁxed income and active equity distributions were based on data provided
by Morningstar, Inc., for mutual funds domiciled in the United States from January 1, 1994,
through July 31, 2014. Equity-market neutral, dedicated short bias, ﬁxed income arbitrage,
convertible arbitrage, event-driven, global macro, managed futures, long/short equity, and
emerging markets’ distributions were based on data provided by Lipper TASS, for hedge funds
in existence from January 1, 1994, through July 31, 2014. All funds are US-dollar-denominated,
adjusting for survivorship bias in each category. Leveraged buyout, real estate, and venture
capital distributions based on data provided by Preqin. Each distribution was based on an
internal rate of return (IRR) calculation from a series of annual cash ﬂows from each fund. For
private equity funds that had not yet distributed 100% of the fund’s capital back to the limited
partners, IRR calculations were based on an ending net asset value. Each distribution has been
adjusted so that the median resides at point zero, to isolate the dispersion.
Source: Authors’ calculations, using data from Morningstar, Inc., Lipper TASS, and Preqin.
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because of the limited access to many managers and the higher due diligence hurdles for complex (and at times opaque) strategies.
Wallick et al. (2015b) found that hedge funds generally did not deliver
long-term outperformance relative to a portfolio balanced between global
equities and global ﬁxed income.9 Their conclusions about private equity
were similar. The researchers nevertheless noted that vehicles such as
venture capital and leveraged buyout (LBO) funds could deliver a ‘liquidity risk premium,’ the reward investors expect for locking up their
money over a speciﬁed period. Absent this expected premium, however,
Wallick et al. (2015b) found that the median venture capital fund has
trailed the returns of the public equity markets, while the median LBO
had more or less matched them. Other researchers have reached similar
conclusions. (Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen 2002; Cochrane 2005;
Kaplan and Schoar 2005; Conroy and Harris 2007; Phalippou and
Gottschalg 2009).
These analyses take place within a total return framework, but the LDI
case for alternatives may be no more compelling. Bosse (2012) showed that
alternatives allocations (real estate investment trusts and commodities, in
particular) funded from a portfolio’s ﬁxed income holdings produced a
notable increase in funding ratio volatility. If funded from the equity allocation, the alternatives allocation must be signiﬁcant (24 percent of portfolio assets in the analysis) to produce a modest decline in the volatility of
portfolio assets relative to plan liabilities ( 3 percent).

A Decision Hierarchy for Plan Sponsors
When we examine increased contributions, reduced costs, and increased risk
in a quantitative framework, a decision-making hierarchy emerges. Table 4.4
details the magnitude and certainty of impact for the three levers. Increased
contributions deliver the most powerful combination of certainty and
impact. Reduced costs have a smaller impact, but a high certainty that the
impact will be realized. Cutting costs is a productive strategy in any investment environment. In ideal circumstances, increased risk has a signiﬁcant
and positive impact, but the likelihood of realizing this impact is uncertain.
We test each lever’s impact on a $100 million portfolio with an initial
allocation of 60 percent global equities and 40 percent global ﬁxed income.
For each lever, we generate 10,000 potential portfolio outcomes over a
10-year period, based on asset class projections from the Vanguard Capital
Markets Model® (Davis et al. 2014).
Increased contributions. This lever is conceptually simple, though ﬁnding
the funds for higher contributions can be devilishly difﬁcult in practice.
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TABLE . Quantifying the decision hierarchy for plan sponsors
Panel A. Simulated 10-year performance of a $100 million portfolio with an allocation
of 60 percent global equities and 40 percent global ﬁxed income, rebalanced annually.
Expected annualized return (%)

Projected portfolio values ($ million)
25th percentile 50th percentile 75th percentile IQR

5.70

136.0

174.1

220.9

84.9

Panel B. Each lever’s incremental impact on portfolio performance.
Change in median
return (pp)

Change in portfolio values
($ million)g
25th
50th
75th
IQR
percentile percentile percentile

Increase contributionsa
+$.5 million
+$1.0 million
Reduce costsb
25 basis points
50 basis points
Increase risk
10 pp increase in equity
allocation
10 pp private equity
allocationc
Static factor tiltsd
10 pp allocation to
active equitye
10 pp hedge fund
allocationf

–
–

+5.9
+11.8

+6.7
+13.3

+7.7
+15.6

+1.8
+3.8

+0.25
+0.50

+3.3
+6.5

+4.1
+8.1

+5.1
+10.0

+1.8
+3.5

+0.52

+1.3

+8.7

+19.9

+18.6

+0.33

+3.7

+3.7

+5.8

+2.1

+0.12
+0.05

+2.6
+0.9

+1.9
+0.8

+2.2
+1.2

0.4
+0.3

0.38

+1.1

6.2

15.0

16.1

Notes:
a
We assume that contributions are made into the portfolio annually at the end of each year over
the horizon.
b
We analyze each lever relative to a cost-free portfolio. To evaluate the impact of reducing costs, we
model an increase in costs (+25 and +50 basis points) relative to the initial portfolio. An alternative
approach would be to assume costs of, say, 75 bps for the original portfolio and then deduct costs of
25 and 50 basis points. The two approaches produce approximately the same results.
c
We assume that private equity provides a 2-percentage-point liquidity premium relative to
public equity. We adjust the strategy’s volatility to match the Sharpe ratio of the broad public
equity market and assume that private equity returns have a correlation of approximately 0.9
with US equity returns, consistent with Vanguard research.
d
We replace 10 percentage points of the broad equity allocation with 5-percentage-point
long-only allocations to the value and size factors. We replace 10 percentage points of the ﬁxed
income allocation with the long-only, cap-weighted credit factor.
e
We replace 10 percentage points of the broad equity allocation with active equity. We assume
excess returns of 0.5 percentage point. Active fund excess return distributions are simulated
based on statistical estimations from historical manager excess return data and are added to
broad market US equity projections to form an active manager return distribution.
f
We replace 10 percentage points of the broad equity allocation with 5 percentage point
allocations to market neutral and multi-strategy hedge funds.
g
The 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile columns correspond to terminal asset value distributions
for each lever. The interquartile range (IQR) of projected portfolio values measures the
dispersion, or degree of certainty, associated with each lever.
Source: Authors’ computation.
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Increased contributions produce no incremental change in the returns
produced by portfolio assets or in the volatility of those returns.
But higher contributions of $0.5 or $1 million have a signiﬁcant impact on
portfolio values. Relative to the original portfolio, annual contributions of
$1 million produce a median expected increase in portfolio value of about
$13 million at the end of the 10-year period. This lever is the most powerful
and predictable of the three levers available to plan sponsors.
Reduced costs. Next, we illustrate the impact of costs by assessing fees of
25 and 50 basis points on the original cost-free portfolio. Lower costs (all else
equal) lead to higher returns, with no incremental increase in return
volatility. The impact on portfolio value at the end of the 10-year period is
more modest. Even so, it is larger than intuition might suggest because of
the compounding of annual cost savings. The longer the time period, the
greater the power of this compounding beneﬁt.
Increased risk. The impact of increased risk varies by strategy. Compared
with increased contributions and reduced cost, the certainty that this impact
will be realized is low. To test each approach, we implement a 10 percent
allocation to the risk-oriented strategy, funding it from the original portfolio’s relevant asset class. Our assumed return premiums are consistent
with averages found in empirical research (Wallick et al. 2015a). We review
the impact of each risk-oriented strategy, from greatest to least.10
Increased equity allocation. A 10-percentage-point increase in the portfolio’s
strategic allocation to global equities adds an incremental 0.52 percentage
point to annualized expected returns and an additional $8.7 million to the
portfolio’s projected median value at the end of the 10-year period. This move
along the efﬁcient frontier also produces higher volatility. In the original
portfolio, the difference between simulated terminal values at the 25th and
75th percentiles (the interquartile range, or IQR) is about $85 million. When
the equity allocation increases by 10 percentage points, the IQR increases to
about $104 million.
Private equity allocation. A 10-percentage-point allocation to private
equity has the next greatest impact, adding an annualized 0.33 percentage
point to returns and $3.7 million to the median portfolio’s terminal value.
The dispersion of portfolio values increases modestly, an interquartile
range of $87 million, compared with $85 million in the original portfolio.
A caution is in order: these summary statistics mask the challenge of
selecting private equity funds that can, in fact, deliver these beneﬁts.
There is no investable beta for private equity funds—no indexed vehicle
that captures the risk and return characteristics of the category. Success
depends on picking above-average performers from a category with a high
dispersion of outcomes.
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Style factor tilts. A 10-percentage-point allocation to equity style factors and
a 10-percentage-point allocation to credit in the ﬁxed income allocation
increase expected annualized return and modestly reduce the dispersion of
returns. (Our analysis is based on long-only implementations of factor tilts.)
The beneﬁts reﬂect the potential persistence of style factor premiums and
the factors’ less-than-perfect correlation with the broad equity and ﬁxed
income markets. The effect is modest, however, and it is important to note
that factors’ excess returns can be highly cyclical. Plan sponsors must have
an ex-ante belief in the persistence of any factor premiums and the patience
to pursue these premiums through good periods and bad.
Active equity allocation. A 10-percentage-point allocation to traditional
active equity strategies has limited impact on portfolio risk and return.
Again, our simulation is based on assumptions about active management
as a category. The performance and impact of a given manager can, and
does, vary widely.
Hedge fund allocation. We model two widely used hedge fund strategies:
market-neutral and multi-strategy. A 5-percentage-point allocation to each,
funded from the original portfolio’s equity allocation, reduces the portfolio’s expected annualized return, while producing a sizable decline in
the volatility of returns. The hedge fund allocation reduces the difference
between 25th and 75th percentile portfolio values to about $69 million,
compared with an IQR of $85 million in the original portfolio.11

Commentary
Some plan sponsors will no doubt use return premium assumptions and
allocation strategies that differ from those used here. In general, however,
we would expect most assumptions to yield similar relative impacts for the
risk-oriented strategies. A decision to increase the portfolio’s equity allocation is likely to be the most consequential. This conclusion is consistent with
Brinson et al. (1986), who found that a broadly diversiﬁed portfolio’s strategic asset allocation was the primary driver of its performance. Subsequent
research by Ibbotson and Kaplan (2000) and Scott et al. (2017) reached
similar conclusions.
The other risk-oriented strategies represent portfolio implementation
decisions that, on average, will have less impact on performance. It is
possible, of course, for an aggressive allocation to an exceptional active
manager or private equity fund to have an outsized impact on portfolio
performance, but this alluring possibility would be an outlier. Our hierarchical framework can help plan sponsors set reasonable expectations for the
potential magnitude and certainty of each risk-oriented strategy.
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The Impact of Investment Decisions
on DB Plan Funding Ratios
Our decision hierarchy has examined investment returns in a traditional
mean-variance portfolio construction framework. Many total-return-oriented
plan sponsors also assess the impact of investment decisions on critical pension plan metrics such as the funding ratio.
Table 4.5 presents incremental changes in the expected funding ratio and
its dispersion resulting from risk-oriented strategies. Our conclusions are
similar to those presented above. An increased equity allocation produces
the greatest impact, but with the least certainty. Private equity, factor tilts,
and active management produce a more limited increase in the funding
ratio and modest changes in the dispersion of the expected funding ratio.
Hedge fund strategies reduce the expected funded ratio status, with a
decrease in the dispersion of the funding ratio.

Conclusion
It is widely believed that we are in an era of more modest returns than those
produced by global equity and ﬁxed income markets over the past few
decades. Lower returns intensify pressure on all investors to meet their
TABLE . Risk-oriented strategies and ten-year change in funded status
Panel A. Projected funded status for portfolio with an allocation of 60 percent global
equities and 40 percent global ﬁxed income, rebalanced annually, and an initial
funding ratio of 82 percent.
Projected funded status (%)
25th percentile

50th percentile

75th percentile

IQR

66.6

97.5

137.0

70.4

Panel B. Each risk-oriented lever’s incremental impact on a portfolio’s funded status.
Change in funded status (percentage points)
25th percentile 50th percentile 75th percentile IQR
10 pp increase in equity
allocation
10 pp private equity allocation
Static factor tilts
10 pp allocation to active equity
10 pp hedge fund allocation

+0.1

+6.2

+15.6

+15.5

+2.8
+1.0
+0.8
+1.1

+3.8
+1.4
+0.9
4.2

+5.5
+0.8
+1.4
12.2

+2.7
0.2
+0.6
13.3

Note: The 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile columns correspond to terminal asset value
distributions for each lever. The interquartile range (IQR) of projected funded status
measures the dispersion, or degree of certainty, associated with each lever.
Source: Authors’ computation.
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goals. Blanchett et al. and Reilly and Byrne in their chapters in this volume
explore savings, working, and Social Security claiming strategies to help
individuals fund retirement liabilities in a lower-return future. The challenges for DB plans may be more daunting because of their relatively
inﬂexible obligations.
Plan sponsors can use three levers to enhance a portfolio’s chances of
meeting these goals: increased contributions, reduced costs—a smart strategy in any return environment—and increased risk. Many sponsors will
need to use a combination of the three levers. Our analysis provides a
framework and a reasonable set of parameters for assessing the magnitude
and certainty of impact delivered by each.

Notes
1. The survey included responses from 178 corporate DB plan sponsors. Plan size
ranged from $20 million to $50 million (11%) to more than $5 billion (8%), with
an average plan size of approximately $1 billion and total plan assets across the
entire survey of approximately $180.9 billion.
2. The expected return on assets (EROA) for corporate DB plans is a component of
pension expense for the sponsor company’s income statement. Public plans use
EROAs to discount their funded future liabilities. EROAs are intended to be very
long-term, typically 30 years, and based on median (expected) results.
3. Reality is more complicated than this hypothetical illustration. Contribution levels
are a function of both regulation and plan sponsor goals. For a US corporate plan
with a funding deﬁcit, for example, the Pension Protection Act of 2006 mandated
a minimum contribution equal to roughly one-seventh of the shortfall.
4. See Sparling (2014) for an overview of derisking strategies triggered by changes
in plan funding status.
5. Regarding the uncertainty associated with using factors, Pappas and Dickson
(2015) note that there is ‘conjecture over whether the historical returns associated with certain factors will persist in the future. For example, Lo and MacKinlay
(1990), Black (1993), and Harvey et al. (2014) contend that the empirical evidence is a ‘result of data mining’ (Pappas and Dickson 2015: 8). Before implementing a tilt using one of these factors, plan sponsors should maintain a clear
understanding of either the risk explanation, behavioral explanation, or both. For
example, if the behavioral explanation holds for a factor, but the risk explanation
does not, the return premium could narrow if investors change their behavior in
the future. Factor tilts also raise questions about how to implement that tilt—longonly, or long-short, beyond the scope of this analysis.
6. Our analysis of traditional actively managed strategies does not include ﬁxed
income funds. For ﬁxed income, our analysis of risk-oriented strategies uses a
static tilt to the credit risk premium. This treatment is consistent with research
from Bosse et al. (2013), who found that a ‘persistent overweighting to corporate
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8.

9.

10.

11.
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credit risk, and not dynamic or tactical portfolio management (i.e., alpha, or
manager skill), has been the primary driver of performance for funds benchmarked to the Barclays US Aggregate Bond Index.’
For example, the NACUBO (2015) Commonfund Study of Endowments found a
passive/active mix for domestic equity of 29 percent/71 percent in 2015.
Wallick et al. (2015b) analyze the relationship between alpha and various quantitative portfolio characteristics. Only the expense ratio and portfolio turnover
provide a statistically signiﬁcant explanation of alpha. ‘More than any other
quantiﬁable attribute we have examined, lower costs are associated with higher
risk-adjusted future returns—or alpha’ (Wallick et al. 2015a: 1). Simply selecting
a fund from the lowest- rather than the highest-cost quartile increased the
likelihood of outperforming a relevant index in the subsequent ﬁve years by
more than 50 percent (a 40% chance versus 26%).
Wallick et al. (2015a) analyze funds of hedge funds, because these are professional managers who are paid to construct a high-quality collection of hedge
funds for clients. This objective is similar to what numerous institutional investors would be attempting to do for their own portfolio. The authors also analyzed
individual hedge funds over the same period using the same database and found
that 56 percent outperformed a traditional portfolio of 60 percent equity and
40 percent ﬁxed income.
These conclusions reﬂect our assumptions about the implementation approaches
and return premiums associated with the risk-oriented strategies. For plan sponsors that use different assumptions, the results of the analysis may vary. But this
framework is not intended to identify an optimal strategy. Rather, it outlines a
process that plan sponsors can use to evaluate the various options.
Although some hedge fund strategies have less volatility than broad market
equities, they introduce consequential new risks such as a high degree of manager risk.
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